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Overcoming repeaterless bounds for the secret key rate capacity of quantum key distribution
protocols is still a challenge with current technology. D. Luong et al. [Applied Physics B 122,
96 (2016)] proposed a protocol to beat a repeaterless bound using one pair of quantum memories.
However, the required experimental parameters for the memories are quite demanding. We extend
the protocol with multiple pairs of memories, operated in a parallel manner to relax these conditions.
We quantify the amount of relaxation in terms of the most crucial memory parameters, given the
number of applied memory pairs. In the case of high-loss channels we found that adding only a few
pair of memories can make the crossover possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols [1–3] can
establish information-theoretically secure secret keys be-
tween two parties. However, we notice that in optical
implementations, the achievable key rate scales roughly
with the single photon transmittance η, which leads to an
exponential drop of the key rate with distance in optical
fibers. This is not just a lack of good protocols, but it
has indeed been proven that the secret key rate capacity
of direct transmission QKD protocols is upper bounded
by this scaling [5–9]. In this work we will focus on the so-
called Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) [8]
bound, which is given by the formula − log2 [1− η] and
scales as η for small transmission η (i.e., long distances).
It is clear that intermediate nodes have to be added
to go beyond the PLOB bound. One recent successful
approach to beat the PLOB bound has been the de-
velopment of Twin-Field QKD [11], which uses one un-
trusted intermediate station to achieve a key rate scal-
ing of
√
η. Security proofs [12–14] and proof-of-principle
experiments [15–18] have already appeared in the litera-
ture.
There have been many proposals constructed in a way
that signals from the parties do not have to arrive at the
same time to the middle station, one possibility is to uti-
lize quantum memory assisted protocols containing one
middle node [4, 25, 26, 28], which can also offer a square
root improvement in the secret key rate capacity since
independent successful arrival of the signals to middle
station suffices for key generation. Also, a scheme with-
out the need for quantum memories has been introduced
in [23] offering the same square root improvement using
optical switches and the idea of multiplexing.
In general, full-scale quantum repeaters [19–22] could
be the final solution for long distance quantum commu-
nication, which, in principle, can provide better than a
square root improvement depending on the number of
nodes applied.
The main goal of this paper is to explore the parameter
regime where a cross-over between a single-node quantum
repeater and the PLOB bound on direct transmission can
be realized. This approach will serve as a benchmark
that pushes technology towards a fully scalable multi-
node quantum repeater. Our approach is to extend the
protocol [4] with the idea of using more quantum memo-
ries at the middle station and operating them in a parallel
manner (using a multiplexing technique), which was also
applied in [23, 27, 29]. We mention that in [27, 29] this
idea has been used in a multi-node repeater setting. Here
we evaluate the performance of this extension of [4] fo-
cusing on the most crucial imperfections of a quantum
memory assisted system, i.e., dephasing [24], non-unit
efficiency of entanglement preparation, photon-fiber cou-
pling and wavelength conversion. We quantify how an in-
creasing number of quantum memories reduces the chal-
lenge on the required memory parameters for overcom-
ing the PLOB bound compared to the one memory pair
case [4]. We will also compare the performance of this
extension to the upper bound for the secret key rate ca-
pacity of any QKD protocol containing one middle node,
placed halfway between the parties [42].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we de-
scribe the investigated protocol together with the math-
ematical model of the components used for its imple-
mentation. Then, in Sec. III the secret key rate of the
protocol is addressed. The main results of the paper are
presented in Sec. IV. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Sec. V. The paper also contains an Appendix, in which
the derivation of the secret key rate formula is given.
II. MODEL OF THE SCHEME
The schematic layout of the protocol investigated here
is depicted in Fig. 1. This protocol can be considered as
an extension of the protocol proposed in [4] to operate
m > 1 memory modules at the same time in a parallel
manner. This parallelization idea was also used in [23].
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FIG. 1: Schematic layout of the investigated protocol having
altogether m memory modules, forming the middle station,
operating in a parallelized manner. Each memory module
contains two quantum memories (QM), the one on the left
(right) emits signals towards Alice (Bob). The central station
is located halfway between Alice are Bob, who are separated
at a distance L. The parties are connected to the central
station via lossy bosonic channels. Bell state measurements
(BSM) can be performed between the QMs on the right and
the left. Note, that QMs are paired for the BSMs via a switch
so it is possible that QMs located within different memory
modules are paired.
Each memory module, labeled by different numbers
from 1 to m in Fig. 1, consists of two quantum memories
(QM). A QM is capable of emitting single photons, which
are entangled to the QM. Moreover, as in [4], we assume,
that Bell state measurements (BSM) can be performed
between the QMs. It is important to note, that since
we have more memories than in the original proposal
we require a switching mechanism, that allows pairing
between QMs that can be located in different memory
modules, labeled by different numbers. We remark that
this switching mechanism has been employed before, for
instance in the protocol investigated in [30], which con-
tains a chain of quantum memory stations. It is also
necessary for the fully optical, adaptive MDI-QKD pro-
tocol proposed in [23].
A. Protocol steps
The protocol is composed of rounds. We define a round
to be the process when all the m memory modules emit
single photons simultaneously towards one party. The
steps of the protocol:
1. For each individual signal, coming from different
QMs, Alice decides to measure it either in the Z
or X-basis with probabilities pZ and pX = 1 − pZ.
It is assumed that Alice chooses the Z basis much
more often than the X-basis (i.e., pZ  pX), as
in [37]. Alice repeats the rounds successively un-
til she detects at least one single photon on her
side. The QMs corresponding to the successful de-
tections are considered to be loaded. We note that
a similar step is also used in the protocol presented
in [27, 30].
2. After Alice succeeded, Bob does the same process
with the QMs on his side.
3. The loaded memories from the two sides are paired
via a switching technique and Bell state measure-
ments (BSM) are performed between them. Note
that due to the switching mechanism applied, the
paired QMs can be located in different memory
modules, labeled by different numbers in Fig. 1.
4. Then the results of the BSMs are announced and
the raw key is obtained as in the original MDI-
QKD [10].
5. The leftover loaded memories, for which it was not
possible to find a pair, are erased and steps 1-4
are repeated until sufficient amount of raw key is
obtained.
We point out that it might be possible to improve the
performance of the protocol if the unpaired memories
from step 5 are not thrown away, however, these mem-
ories will continue dephasing until the other party loads
some of her/his QMs and pairings can start. Therefore,
we do not expect a significant performance boost by keep-
ing these QMs. We note that by the key rate of the pro-
tocol we actually mean the key rate per mode in order to
be able to make a fair comparison to the PLOB bound.
Therefore, the fact that BB84 measurements are used,
brings in a factor of 1/2 in the secret key rate since two
optical modes are required for BB84.
B. Modeling of components
We reuse the description of all the components used
in [4]. This is reasonable since when we look at a partic-
ular pairing, that is essentially the same process which
was considered in the original proposal. The only ad-
ditional component that we apply here is a device (e.g.
a switch), that is capable of pairing [38] the successfully
loaded quantum memories (even if they are located in dif-
ferent memory modules) to perform the BSMs between
them. For simplicity, we assume this device to be per-
fect, that is, it is lossless and the pairing can be done
instantly. To have all the parameters at hand describ-
ing the imperfections of our implementation, we briefly
repeat the description of the components in [4].
1. Quantum memories
The QM can generates the photon-memory entangled
state |φ+〉 with success probability ηp. Each trial of gen-
3erating this maximally entangled state needs a prepara-
tion time of Tp.
The memory-channel coupling efficiency is denoted by
ηc, which includes the probability that the emitted pho-
ton will enter the channel and also the probability of a
successful wavelength conversion, if it is necessary.
The dephasing time constant of the QM is T2. Ba-
sically, T2 characterises how fast the state stored by
the QM deviates from the original, maximally entan-
gled state. The dephasing is modelled by the following
map [30], that gives the quantum state of the QM after
t time has passed given its initial state ρ:
Γt(ρ) = (1− λdp(t))ρ+ λdp(t)ZρZ, (1)
where Z is the Pauli Z operator and
λdp(t) =
1− e−t/T2
2
. (2)
2. Optical channels
Alice and Bob are both connected to the central mem-
ory station via optical fibers of length L/2, which means
that the distance between them is L. The speed of light
in the optical fiber is denoted by c. The transmittance
of a fiber of length l is given by
ηch = exp (−l/Latt) , (3)
where Latt is the attenuation length of the fiber.
Due to the misalignment in the channel between Alice
and the middle station, the initial photon-memory state
|φ+〉 is transformed into the following state after passing
through the channel:
(1− emA)|φ+〉〈φ+|+ emA|ψ−〉〈ψ−|, (4)
where emA is the probability of a misalignment error.
The same is true on Bob’s side as well with misalignment
error probability emB . Since the middle station is located
halfway between the parties, we will assume that
e := emA = emB . (5)
3. Detectors
Alice and Bob both have threshold detectors with dark
count probability pd. To perform the BB84 measure-
ments Alice and Bob need to use a detector setup con-
sisting of two detectors and an optical device that can
distinguish between the eigenstates of the X and Z op-
erators (for instance a polarizing beam splitter). The
efficiency of the detectors included in such a setup is
denoted by ηd. The effect of dark counts is taken into
account by replacing the quantum state ρ of the pho-
ton heading towards the BB84 detection setup with the
following state
α(η)ρ+ (1− α(η))1
2
, (6)
where η represents the probability that the photon
reaches the BB84 detection module and
α(η) =
η(1− pd)
1− (1− η)(1− pd)2 . (7)
4. Bell state measurement
The success probability of the BSM is pBSM . We also
introduce the BSM ideality parameter λBSM , which de-
scribes how close is the performed BSM to a perfect BSM.
It is modelled by applying a depolarizing channel to the
QM states before entering an ideal BSM, therefore the
state entering into a perfect BSM instead of ρ is given by
λBSMρ+ (1− λBSM )1
4
. (8)
III. SECRET KEY RATE
The secret key rate of the extended protocol is given
by the usual formula
R =
Y
2
[1− h(eX)− fh(eZ)] , (9)
where Y is the yield, which in our case means the ex-
pected number of produced raw key bits through steps
1-4 of the protocol per channel use. The function h is
the binary entropy function, eX (eZ) is the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) in the X (Z)-basis and f is the er-
ror correction inefficiency function. We remark that this
is not the optimal protocol to extract secret key in this
setting and several improvements such as the use of the
six-state protocol [31, 32], as used in [33], or noisy pre-
processing [34, 35] could be used but this formula is good
enough for our purposes, that is, to show the amount of
improvement compared to the protocol in [4]. As men-
tioned previously, the factor 1/2 is included since two
optical modes are used. The channel uses are counted
in a similar way as in the original proposal, that is, it
is taken to be a product of m and the maximum of the
number of rounds that Alice and Bob have to perform in
order to obtain at least one raw key bit.
On the one hand, having m > 1 makes the probability
higher that success is declared in each round for a given
distance, which means that once Alice declares success,
the QMs on her side will dephase for less time since Bob
also have a higher chance to declare success in each round
on his side compared to the m = 1 case, consequently the
error rate will decrease. On the other hand, it is possible
that in steps 1-4 more than one raw key bits are obtained.
Therefore, when deriving the secret key rate we have to
take into account the expected number of QM pairs that
we can obtain, similarly to how it is done in [23].
The exact derivation of the yield Y and the error rates
eX and eZ in the case of multiple quantum memories for
the secret key rate formula can be found in the Appendix.
4We remark that, to obtain the secret key rate we made
use of the results presented in the original proposal [4]
and in [23], which is a QKD protocol similar to our ex-
tension, however it can be implemented without using
QMs.
IV. RESULTS
In this chapter, we numerically evaluate the secret key
rate formula, obtained in the Appendix and compare it
to the PLOB [8] bound in two cases. In the first case, the
photons emitted by the QMs are converted to telecom-
munication wavelength and in the second case we omit
this conversion step, therefore the photons emitted by the
QMs enter the fiber at their original wavelength, which
means that the corresponding loss in the channel can be
very high for these non-converted photons. Our inves-
tigations show, that the most crucial parameters of the
setup are the dephasing time constant of the QMs, T2,
and the overall efficiency ηtotal = ηpηcηd, which is defined
as the product of the entanglement preparation efficiency,
the coupling efficiency and the detection efficiency. For
both cases we fix the values of the following parameters:
• Tp = 2µs (entanglement preparation time)
• c = 2 · 108 m/s (speed of light in the optical fiber)
• pd = 1.8 · 10−11 (dark count probability per detec-
tor)
• e = 1 % (misalignment error)
• f = 1.16 (error correction inefficiency)
• λBSM = 0.98 [39] (BSM ideality parameter)
• pBSM = 1 (BSM success probability)
A. With wavelength conversion
First, to have a better sense of the amount of improve-
ment that our extension can offer compared to the orig-
inal proposal, in Fig. 2 we plot the secret key rate of
the extended protocol for the special cases of m = 1,
m = 400 and m → ∞ for a specific T2 and ηtotal value
(see below) together with the PLOB bound and a similar
bound corresponding to secret key rate capacity of QKD
protocols that contain one middle node [42]. As men-
tioned previously, in this case the photons emitted by
the QMs are converted to telecommunication wavelength
so we set Latt = 22 km corresponding to low-loss in the
channel. Apart from the previously set parameters, we
use the following values for the remaining parameters,
similarly to [4]:
• T2 = 2 s [40] (dephasing time constant)
• ηp = 0.66 (entanglement preparation efficiency)
• ηc = 0.05∗0.5 [41] (photon-fiber coupling efficiency
* wavelength conversion efficiency)
• ηd = 0.7 (detection efficiency)
• These values result in ηtotal = ηpηcηd = 0.0115.
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate versus distance for m = 1, m = 400
and m→∞ with ηtotal = 0.01155 and T2 = 2 s (see below for
more details) compared to the PLOB bound and the upper
bound for the secret key rate capacity of any protocol with
one middle node, placed halfway between the parties [42]. The
bounds are represented by dashed curves.
We can already see in Fig. 2 that increasing the num-
ber of applied memory modules (m) can make overcom-
ing the PLOB bound possible, which was not feasible
in the case of m = 1 for the above listed T2 and ηtotal
parameter values. Indeed, the beating happens around
m = 400. Of course, we do not stand a chance against the
fundamental secret key capacity bound for QKD proto-
cols containing one middle node since in our scheme the
middle node comes with many imperfections. We note,
that the general (m ≥ 1) secret key rate formula derived
in the Appendix taken in the special case of m = 1 gives
the same curve as in [4].
Now, we take a grid of points in the QM parame-
ter space ηtotal-T2 and for each point (ηtotal, T2), given
the number of memory modules m, we determine if the
PLOB bound is overcome by the extended protocol. The
result of the numerical simulations appears in Fig. 3. We
note that the secret key rate curves in Fig. 2 correspond
to the point A (ηtotal = 0.0115, T2 = 2 s) in Fig. 3, which
leads to a crossover for m ≈ 400.
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FIG. 3: Regions in the ηtotal − T2 memory parameter space
where the extended protocol beats the PLOB bound, given
that Alice and Bob have m pairs of memories between them.
Point A has coordinates ηtotal = 0.0115, T2 = 2 s.
We have already seen in Fig. 2 that adding more mem-
ory modules can relax the required quality of the QMs
(in terms of T2 and ηtotal) for our protocol to be able to
beat the PLOB bound. In Fig. 3, we have confirmed and
quantified this effect in the whole parameter space ηtotal-
T2. Therefore, given the parameters of the QMs at one’s
disposition one can check the required number of memory
stations to beat the PLOB bound. Similarly, if we know
how many QM modules can be handled in a parallel man-
ner in our system, then we can read off from Fig. 3 how
to improve the QM parameters to beat the PLOB bound.
By looking at the slope of the lines bordering the regions
in Fig. 3 we observe that we need a smaller relative im-
provement in the parameter ηtotal than in T2 to step into
regions corresponding to smaller values of m. However,
it can also be seen that the improvement is moderate,
in order to have a significant relaxation on the required
parameters T2 and ηtotal the number of memory modules
has to be very high, which is probably more challenging
to manage experimentally than achieving better T2 and
ηtotal values for the QMs in the first place.
B. Without wavelength conversion
In this section, we consider the high-loss channel sce-
nario (i.e., small Latt). This makes surpassing the PLOB
bound easier, since the emitted photons will not travel so
far, therefore the loaded QMs will dephase for less time.
This means that high-loss already relaxes the conditions
on the parameters T2 and ηtotal, so overcoming can be
made possible with adding less memory modules than in
the low-loss scenario. For the simulations, we take the at-
tenuation length over wavelength data (see Fig. 4a) from
a commercially available optical fiber [36] and we assume
that the wavelength of the photons emitted by the QMs
falls in this range, moreover, the photons are directed
into the optical fiber without wavelength-conversion. In
this setting, we obtain numerically the minimum num-
ber of required memory modules for beating the PLOB
bound as a function of the emitted wavelengths. In the
simulations, to have the same ηtotal value as in Fig. 2 we
set ηc = 0.025 ∗ 1, with the conversion efficiency being 1
since the conversion step is omitted. The other param-
eters have the same values as in the previous sections.
The results can be seen in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4: (a) Attenuation length versus wavelength for the
applied fiber [36]. (b) The minimum number of the neces-
sary memory pairs for beating the PLOB bound, as a func-
tion of the wavelength of the emitted photons, assuming that
the optical fiber [36] is employed. We set T2 = 2 s and
ηtotal = 0.01155.
6In Fig. 4b, we see, that in the high-loss scenario, adding
just a couple more modules can help beating the PLOB
bound which was not possible before with m = 1. Note,
however, that in this regime using the optical fiber [36]
the distance between the parties is comparatively short
(in the order of hundreds of meters). Nevertheless, im-
plementing a QKD protocol that can beat the PLOB
bound would be a relevant result no matter how small is
the distance between the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have evaluated the performance of the
protocol proposed in [4] when extended with multiple QM
pairs, operated in a parallel way. We have determined
how the number of applied QM pairs affects the required
QM parameters (e.g., the dephasing time constant) for
beating the PLOB bound. We have found and described
quantitatively that with this extension one can beat the
PLOB bound with lower quality QMs. The advantage
compared to the original protocol [4] comes from the fact
that there are more QMs available in a round, therefore
it is more probable that the parties will load at least one
of the QMs on their side, so the pairings and the BSMs
between the loaded QMs can start sooner, which means
that the QMs will dephase for less time.
However, to have a significant relaxation on the QM
parameters one needs to use many QM pairs. At this
point we also note that implementing this protocol could
be challenging due to the multiple memory modules and
the matching mechanism needed, however, we believe
that it should still be easier than realizing a full-scale
quantum repeater. We have also explored the high-loss
limit, in which, adding just a few more QMs can actu-
ally make the crossover possible since the photons do not
travel so far, therefore there is less time for dephasing in
the QMs in the first place.
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Appendix: Derivation of the secret key rate
In this appendix, first, we recall the secret key rate
formula from [4] for the original (m = 1) case, assuming
that the memory station is located halfway between Al-
ice and Bob, who are separated at a distance L. Then,
we describe how to modify the quantities therein for ob-
taining the secret key rate formula for the m > 1 case.
1. Results for the m = 1 case
The secret key rate for the m = 1 case [4] is lower
bounded [43, 44] by the quantity
R =
Y
2
[1− h(eX)− fh(eZ)] , (A.1)
where Y is the yield, which represents the probability per
channel use that the parties obtain a raw key bit. h is
the binary entropy function, eX (eZ) is the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) in the X (Z)-basis and f is the error
correction inefficiency function.
The probability that a photon (emitted by a memory
module) is detected is given by
η = ηtotale
− L2Latt . (A.2)
Taking into account the dark counts, the probability that
a detector clicks can be written as
η′ = 1− (1− η)(1− pd)2, (A.3)
where pd is the dark count probability of a detector. Let
NA (NB) denote the number of trials until Alice’s (Bob’s)
detector clicks. Note, that NA (NB) is a geometrically
distributed random variable with success probability pa-
rameter η′. The yield in the original case was shown to
be [4, 26]
Y =
pBSM
E[max(NA, NB)]
= pBSM
(
2
η′
− 1
2η′ − (η′)2
)−1
,
(A.4)
where E is the expectation value operator and pBSM is
the success probability of the BSM between the memo-
ries. The quantity E[max(NA, NB)] in the denominator
of Eq. (A.4) represents the average number of channel
uses.
Now, we recall the QBERs for the m = 1 case. In [4],
it is shown, that
eX = λBSMα
2(η) [mis(1− dp) + dp(1− mis)]
+
1− λBSMα2(η)
2
, (A.5)
where λBSM is the BSM ideality parameter, the function
α is given by Eq. (7),
mis = 2e(1− e), (A.6)
where e is the misalignment error in one channel. More-
over
dp = E[λdp(tA)[1− λdp(tB)] + λdp(tB)[1− λdp(tA)]].
(A.7)
The quantities mis and dp are regarded as the total
misalignment and dephasing errors in the system. The
function λdp is given by Eq. (2) and, as mentioned previ-
ously, describes the dephasing of the state stored in the
quantum memory over time. The quantity tA (tB) is the
7time that the loaded quantum memory on Alice’s (Bob’s)
side is left to dephase for. The time that elapses between
the rounds is
τ = Tp +
L
c
, (A.8)
where Tp is the preparation time for a QM and c denotes
the speed of light in the optical fibers used. The term L/c
comes from the fact that the signals need to reach Alice
(or Bob) and they have to report back to the memory
station whether they obtained a successful detection or
not. With this quantity we have that
tA = NBτ +
L
c
(A.9)
and
tB =
L
c
. (A.10)
After Alice gets a successful detection on her side, the
memories have already been dephasing for L/(2c) time,
on the top of this, reporting the success to the middle sta-
tion takes at least an extra L/(2c) time. Moreover, Alice
has to wait until Bob also gets a successful detection so
that they can perform the BSM between the memories,
this is accounted for in the term NBτ . Bob does not
have to wait for anybody else, so tB only contains the
term L/c. For deriving the quantity dp, one has to cal-
culate the following expectation value E[e−tA/T2 ], which
has been derived in [4]
E[e−tA/T2 ] =
η′ exp
(
− LcT2
)
exp(τ/T2) + η′ − 1 . (A.11)
With this expectation value and due to the linearity of
the expectation value operator dp can be derived easily,
with which eX can be obtained.
Moreover, eZ is given by
eZ = λBSMα
2(η)mis +
1− λBSMα2(η)
2
. (A.12)
2. Results for the m > 1 case
Here, we explain how to obtain the secret key rate for-
mula for the m > 1 case, using the previously presented
results from [4].
The extension of the memory station to contain m > 1
memory modules means that in step 2 of the protocol,
Bob has to perform less rounds until success, since he
has a higher chance to detect at least one photon out of
the m > 1 signals than in the original m = 1 case for a
given L distance. Therefore, Alice (who already has at
least one loaded memory on her side) has to wait less for
Bob, which means that loaded memories on Alice’s side
will dephase for less time on average, meaning that the
error rate will decrease. Thus, all the quantities that in-
clude the expectation values of the number of performed
rounds has to be changed for the case of m > 1. More-
over, with this extension, it is possible, that more pairs
are obtained in a round, however, at the same time the
number of channel uses also increase. Apart from these
modifications each pairing is basically the same process
as it was for m = 1, even if in one round more pairings
can happen. This means that the structure of the for-
mula given by Eq. (A.1) stays valid even for the m > 1
case, however, one has to apply the modified quantities,
that will be given in the remainder of this section.
From Eq. (A.4) and Eq. (A.5) it is clear, that in
Eq. (A.1), Y and eX have to be modified since these
are the quantities that contain the expectation values of
waiting times and number of channel uses. Eq. (A.12)
shows, that eZ does not depend neither on the expecta-
tion value of waiting times nor on the expected number
of channel uses, therefore it does not have to be modified.
Let ps denote the probability that at least one (out of
m) of Alice’s (or Bob’s) detectors clicks, meaning that
she (or he) declares success in a round. It is easy to see
that
ps = 1− (1− η′)m. (A.13)
We remark that, as expected, m = 1 implies that ps = η
′.
Let us keep the notation NA (NB) to denote the num-
ber of trials until Alice (Bob) declares success. In the
m > 1 case, success means that Alice’s (Bob’s) detectors
detect at least one out of the m photons emitted by the
memory modules. Therefore, NA (NB) is still a geomet-
rically distributed random variable, however, with a suc-
cess probability parameter ps for the m > 1 case (which
was η′ for the m = 1 case). This means that whenever an
expectation value of a quantity containing NA and NB
was calculated for the m = 1 case, the corresponding ex-
pectation value for the m > 1 case can be obtained from
the single memory (m = 1) case by replacing η′ with ps
in its expression.
Let Yk denote the probability that the parties obtain
k sifted bits after the pairings. The yield in the extended
case can be written as
Y =
∑m
k=1 k Yk
mE[max(NA, NB)]
, (A.14)
where, similarly to Eq. (A.4) the denominator
mE[max(NA, NB)] represents the expected number of
channel uses to obtain at least one raw key bit, here m
appears since in each round the memory modules emit m
signals corresponding to m channel uses in each round.
We note, that since we use polarization encoding, we need
two modes per qubit signal but this is already accounted
for in the secret key rate formula given by Eq. (A.1) as
a factor 1/2. The quantity E[max(NA, NB)] is given in
Eq. (A.4) for the m = 1 case. Due to our previous re-
mark, for the extended case it can be written as (compare
8with Eq. (A.4))
mE[max(NA, NB)] = m
(
2
ps
− 1
2ps − p2s
)
(A.15)
Now, we derive Yk. The derivation is basically the
same as in [23]. Let us introduce
Bmi (p) =
(
m
i
)
pi(1− p)m−i, (A.16)
which is the probability mass function of the binomial
distribution with parameter 0 < p < 1. Let kA (kB)
denote the number of successful detections on Alice’s
(Bob’s) side in a successful round, remember that a round
is successful when there is at least one successful detec-
tion. The probability that min(kA, kB) = l, which is
exactly the number of pairs that we can obtain, is given
by
pl=min(kA,kB) = 2B
m
l (η
′)
m∑
x=l
Bmx (η
′)− (Bml (η′))2.
(A.17)
This is so since either we have l detections at Alice’s side
and l, l + 1, . . . , m detections at Bob’s side or the other
way around (this introduces the factor 2 in Eq. (A.17)),
but the case when they both have l clicks is counted twice,
therefore this has to be subtracted.
The probability to make k pairs can be written as
pkbits =
m∑
y=k
py=min(kA,kB)B
y
k(pBSM ). (A.18)
This expression holds since if the minimum of the suc-
cessful detections at Alice’s and Bob’s side is y ≥ k then,
out of the possible y pairs we obtain k pairs with proba-
bility Byk(pBSM ). With this we have that
Yk =
∞∑
a=1
∞∑
b=1
(1− ps)a−1(1− ps)b−1pkbits = pkbits
p2s
,
(A.19)
where we summed over the possible number of rounds
that the parties have to perform until they both have at
least one successful detection. Thus we have that
Y =
1
p2s
∑m
k=1 k pkbits
m
(
2
ps
− 12ps−p2s
) , (A.20)
which can now be calculated with Eq. (A.17) and
Eq. (A.18). We note, that in [23],
∑m
k=1 k pkbits is written
in the following different form:
m∑
k=1
k pkbits = mpBSM [η
′ − gm(η′)], (A.21)
where
gm(η
′) = η′(1− η′)
[m−1∑
i=0
[
Bm−1i (η
′)
]2
+
m−1∑
i=1
Bm−1i (η
′)Bm−1i−1 (η
′)
]
(A.22)
from which it is easier to extract the expression for Y in
the case of m → ∞ since gm → 0 as m → ∞ as it is
shown in [23].
Now, we adapt eX , given by Eq. (A.5), for the m > 1
case. In doing so, we only have to modify the total de-
phasing error dp, given by Eq. (A.7), since this is the
quantity that contains the expectation value of the num-
ber of performed rounds. For this, we have to calculate
expectation values of the form E[e−tA/T2 ], where tA is
the amount of time that Alice’s loaded QMs are left to
dephase for and is still given by Eq. (A.9). This expecta-
tion value is given by Eq. (A.11) for the m = 1 case. As
we have pointed out before, to generalize the expectation
value from the m = 1 case to the m > 1 case, we simply
have to replace η′ with ps in Eq. (A.11):
E[e−tA/T2 ] =
ps exp
(
− LcT2
)
exp(τ/T2) + ps − 1 . (A.23)
Using this, we can express dp for the m > 1 case as
dp =
(
1− 2λdp
(
L
c
))1
2
− 1
2
ps exp
(
− LcT2
)
exp
(
τ
T2
)
+ ps − 1

+ λdp
(
L
c
)
. (A.24)
As argued previously, eZ stays the same for the m > 1
case and is given by Eq. (A.12).
Plugging Eq. (A.20), Eq. (A.5) with Eq. (A.24) and
Eq. (A.12) into Eq. (A.1) we obtain the secret key rate
formula of the protocol for m > 1.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel and H. Zbinden: Quan-
tum cryptography, Reviews of Modern Physics 74, 145
(2002).
[2] V. Scarani, H. B.-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek,
N. Lu¨tkenhaus and M. Peev: The security of practical
quantum key distribution, Reviews of Modern Physics
981, 1301 (2009).
[3] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty and K. Tamaki: Secure quantum key
distribution, Nature Photonics 8, 595-604 (2014).
[4] D. Luong, L. Jiang, J. Kim, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus: Over-
coming lossy channel bounds using a single quantum re-
peater node, Applied Physics B 122, 96 (2016).
[5] S. Pirandola, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, S. L. Braunstein and S.
Lloyd: Direct and Reverse Secret-Key Capacities of a
Quantum Channel, Physical Review Letters 102, 050503
(2009).
[6] M. Takeoka, S. Guha, and M. M. Wilde: Fundamental
rate-loss tradeoff for optical quantum key distribution,
Nature Communications 5, 5235 (2014).
[7] M. M. Wilde, M. Tomamichel and M. Berta: Con-
verse Bounds for Private Communication Over Quantum
Channels IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 63,
1792-1817 (2017).
[8] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi:
Fundamental limits of repeaterless quantum communica-
tions, Nature Communications 8, 15043 (2017).
[9] S. Pirandola et al.: Theory of channel simulation and
bounds for private communication, Quantum Science and
Technology 3, 040101 (2018).
[10] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi: Measurement-Device-
Independent Quantum Key Distribution, Physical Re-
view Letters 108, 130503, (2012).
[11] M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes and A. J. Shields:
Overcoming the ratedistance limit of quantum key distri-
bution without quantum repeaters, Nature 557, 400403
(2018).
[12] C. Cui et al.: Twin-field quantum key distribution
without phase post-selection, preprint arXiv:1807.02334,
(2018).
[13] J. Lin and N. Lu¨tkenhaus: Simple security analysis of
phase-matching measurement-device-independent quan-
tum key distribution, Physical Review A 98, 042332
(2018).
[14] M. Curty, K. Azuma, H.-K. Lo: Simple security proof
of twin-field type quantum key distribution protocol, npj
Quantum Information 5, 64 (2019).
[15] X. Zhong, J. Hu, M. Curty, L. Qian and H.-K.
Lo: Proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of
twin-field type quantum key distribution, preprint
arXiv:1902.10209v1 (2019).
[16] M. Minder et al.: Experimental quantum key distribu-
tion beyond the repeaterless secret key capacity, Nature
Photonics 13, 334-338 (2019)
[17] Y. Liu et al.: Experimental Twin-Field Quantum Key
Distribution Through Sending-or-Not-Sending, preprint
arXiv:1902.06268v1 (2019).
[18] S. Wang et al.: Beating the Fundamental Rate-Distance
Limit in a Proof-of-Principle Quantum Key Distribution
System, Physical Review X 9, 021046 (2019).
[19] H.-J. Briegel, W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac and P. Zoller: Quantum
repeaters: the role of imperfect local operations in quan-
tum communication, Physical Review Letters 81, 5932
(1998).
[20] L.-M. Duan, M. D. Lukin, J. I. Cirac and P. Zoller: Long-
distance quantum communication with atomic ensembles
and linear optics, Nature 414, 413418 (2001).
[21] P. van Loock, T. D. Ladd, K. Sanaka, F. Yamaguchi,
K. Nemoto, W. J. Munro and Y. Yamamoto: Hybrid
Quantum Repeater Using Bright Coherent Light, Physi-
cal Review Letters 96, 240501 (2006).
[22] P. Kok, C. P. Williams and J. P. Dowling: Construction
of a quantum repeater with linear optics, Physical Review
A 68, 022301 (2003).
[23] K. Azuma, K. Tamaki and W. J. Munro: All-photonic
intercity quantum key distribution, Nature Communica-
tions 6:10171 (2015).
[24] B. Zhao et al.: A millisecond quantum memory for scal-
able quantum networks, Nature Physics 5, 95-99 (2009).
[25] S. Abruzzo, H. Kampermann and D. Bruß:
Measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution with quantum memories, Physical Review A
89, 012301 (2014).
[26] C. Panayi, M. Razavi, X. Ma and N. Lu¨tkenhaus:
Memory-assisted measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution, New Journal of Physics 16,
043005 (2014).
[27] S. Guha, H. Krovi, C. A. Fuchs, Z. Dutton, J. A. Slater,
C. Simon and W. Tittel: Rate-loss analysis of an efficient
quantum repeater architecture, Physical Review A 92,
022357 (2015).
[28] N. L. Piparo, M. Razavi and W. J. Munro: Measurement-
device-independent quantum key distribution with nitro-
gen vacancy centers in diamond, Physical Review A 95,
022338 (2017).
[29] N. L. Piparo, N. Sinclair and M. Razavi: Memory-
assisted quantum key distribution resilient against
multiple-excitation effects, Quantum Science and Tech-
nology 3, 1 (2017).
[30] M. Razavi, M. Piani, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus: Quantum re-
peaters with imperfect memories: Cost and scalability,
Physical Review A 80, 032301 (2009).
[31] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and N. Gisin: Incoherent and
coherent eavesdropping in the six-state protocol of quan-
tum cryptography, Physical Review A 59, 4238-4248
(1999).
[32] D. Bruß and and C. Macchiavello: Optimal Eavesdrop-
ping in Cryptography with Three-Dimensional Quantum
States, Physical Review Letters 88, 127901 (2002).
[33] F. Rozpedek et al.: Near-term quantum-repeater exper-
iments with nitrogen-vacancy centers: Overcoming the
limitations of direct transmission, Physical Review A 99,
052330 (2019).
[34] B. Kraus, N. Gisin and R. Renner: Lower and Upper
Bounds on the Secret-Key Rate for Quantum Key Dis-
tribution Protocols Using One-Way Classical Communi-
cation, Physical Review Letters 95, 080501 (2005).
[35] R. Renner: Security of Quantum Key Distribution, PhD
thesis arXiv:quant-ph/0512258v2 (2006).
[36] https://www.thorlabs.com/ thorprod-
uct.cfm?partnumber=FG050LGA
[37] H.-K. Lo, H.F. Chau and M. Ardehali: Efficient Quan-
tum Key Distribution Scheme and a Proof of Its Un-
conditional Security, Journal of Cryptology 18, 133-165
(2005).
[38] E. M.-Scott: Quantum buffering for time-multiplexed
multi-photon entanglement, poster presented at
CEWQO2019.
[39] J. Benhelm, G. Kirchmair, C. F. Roos and R. Blatt: To-
wards fault-tolerant quantum computing with trapped
ions, Nature Physics 4, 463466 (2008).
[40] S. Olmschenk, K. C. Younge, D. L. Moehring, D. N. Mat-
sukevich, P. Maunz and C. Monroe: Manipulation and
detection of a trapped Yb+ hyperfine qubit, Physical Re-
view A 76, 052314 (2007).
10
[41] E. W. Streed, B. G. Norton, A. Jechow, T. J. Wein-
hold and D. Kielpinski: Imaging of Trapped Ions with
a Microfabricated Optic for Quantum Information Pro-
cessing, Physical Review Letters 106, 010502 (2011).
[42] S. Pirandola: End-to-end capacities of a quantum com-
munication network, Communications Physics 2, 51
(2019).
[43] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill: Simple proof of security of
the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, Physical
Review Letters 85, 441444 (2000).
[44] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus and J. Preskill:
Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect de-
vices, Quantum Information and Computation 4, 325-360
(2004).
